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Effects of Managers’ Power on Capital Structure:
A Study on Italian Agricultural Cooperatives
By Carlo Russo, Dave Weatherspoon, Chris Peterson and Massimo Sabbatini
1
Abstract:
Excessive leverage is one of the most important problems facing Italian agricultural
cooperatives as the international competition in the EU intensifies. An empirical study in
500 agricultural cooperatives support the hypothesis that cooperatives characterized as
having “powerful managers” have a capital structure that is significantly different from
the “non-powerful manager” cooperatives. Powerful manager cooperatives were
characterized as having: less leverage, a focus on minimizing financial risk by increasing
their equity/asset ratio, a long term strategy that increased their probability of long term
international competitiveness
Introduction
The food system is rapidly evolving. Even if the driving forces and the direction of this
change are not always clear, many authors agree that the future food system will be
global, consumer oriented and capital intensive. These three factors stretch the limits of
the traditional agricultural cooperatives, usually characterized by limited exports, rigidity
in input supply and low equity (Dobson, 1998; Cook, 1993; Chesnik, 1997). This paper
will focus on the capitalization issue since responding to global demands will be difficult
for Italian cooperatives due to their excessive financial leverage.
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Many Italian agricultural cooperatives are in financial distress due to excessive leverage,
which reduces cooperative’s efficiency by adding costs both in terms of higher
transaction costs and missed profit opportunities (Manelli, 1996). Economic literature
attributed the difficulties in building an efficient capital structure to various factors such
as the absence of a secondary market for stocks, the high opportunity cost of money for
farmers and the investment horizon of patrons (Staatz, 1989; Murray, 1983; Vitaliano,
1983). These reasons related with the capitalization problem to members’ unwillingness
(or inability) to provide adequate financial resources to the cooperative. Some Italian
authors related the issue directly to the specific Italian cooperative regulation about the
legal limits on dividends, equity shares and equity redemption (Iannello 1994, Mazzoli
and Rocchi, 1996).
Empirical data confirm Italian cooperative undercapitalization. A recent survey showed
that, out of a sample of 2,322 Italian agricultural cooperatives, 48% have an equity/asset
ratio lower than 0.10 (source: Confcooperative). Fiorentini (1995) compared the capital
structure of a sample of agricultural cooperatives with a sample of investor owned firms
(IOFs) and found that cooperatives were relatively undercapitalized (0.4 equity/fixed
asset ratio vs. 0.7 for IOFs). Cooperative capitalization is not exclusively an Italian issue.
In the US, recent surveys show a decline in membership and patron equity level (USDA
1997). US cooperative capitalization varies among industries: the average industry
debt/assets ratio ranges from .49 for cotton to .81 for poultry/livestock (Chesnik, 1997).
Although this paper focuses on Italian cooperatives, the conclusions have global
implications.4
In this paper the factors influencing Italian cooperatives’ capital structure were analyzed
using the coalition theoretical framework (Staatz, 1983). An empirical test provided
evidence of the framework’s conclusions utilizing a new dataset about Italian
cooperatives. The study hypothesis is that the distribution of the bargaining power among
the coalition’s group influenced the actual leverage level of the cooperative. The analysis
has two steps: first an index was developed that represents cooperative managers’ power,
then, it was tested for its influence on the capital structure using a GLS regression model.
The Model and the Data
The coalition theoretical framework states that a cooperative consists of many groups
having different objectives and attempting to maximize their own individual utility even
at the expense of other groups. This situation is particularly relevant to cooperatives
because costs and benefits can be allocated among groups according to a multiplicity of
rules. By setting prices for members’ products, offering specific services and choosing
capitalization strategies, the coalition decides which group will profit and which one will
pay the cost of operations. Then, each group decides which strategy to support
considering not only the total returns but also the way costs and benefits are allocated.
Investments with low returns may become more attractive if it is possible to transfer a
sufficient portion of the cost to another group. In this context, if the transaction costs
within the groups are high enough, the adoption of Pareto - inefficient strategies are
possible. In fact, if such transaction costs are higher than the increase in value caused by
the efficient strategy, groups have no incentive to negotiate an efficient solution based on5
the compensation principle, as stated by the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960). As a
consequence, the strategy of the cooperative will not be determined solely by an
efficiency principle, but it may be influenced by the initial distribution of resources and
power among the groups of the coalition.
This study focuses on the evaluation of the effects of the bargaining power of managers.
According to the general formulation of the principal-agent model, if members were not
able to monitor (and enforce), managers have the incentive to behave opportunistically by
maximizing their own utility instead of the members’. Since Italian cooperative managers
usually were compensated on fixed wages not based on performance, they are expected to
support risk-minimizing strategies rather than members’ return maximizing ones. Then,
the hypothesis is that, when managers effectively influence the capital structure through
their bargaining power, the expected average equity/asset ratio would be higher, more
sensitive to risk and less sensitive to the cooperative profitability and cost of financing.
The hypothesis testing was performed on a data set provided by the Confederazione
Cooperative Italiane
2 including both financial and structural data. The original data set
included 2,322 agricultural cooperatives. The 521 firm sample used in this analysis was
selected based on two criteria: availability of a three-year time series and the availability
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of detailed information about the value of patronage refunds
3. Also, the federations of
cooperatives were excluded from the sample because of their peculiar characteristics
4.
Measurement of Manager Power
The first step in the analysis consisted of identifying cooperatives characterized as having
effective manager’s bargaining power (i.e. the ability of effectively influence the
strategies by imposing his/her preferences on the other groups within the cooperative).
In order to identify cooperatives characterized by effective manager’s power, indicators
were developed based on three assumptions:
1.  Powerful managers can transfer costs from the cooperative to members. Managers
have the incentive to keep resources within the cooperative, where they could control
them. Powerful managers reduce the resource transfer to members both in terms of
profits and patronage.
2.  Managers’ power is directly related to the number of members. Due to negotiations
among groups of members, transaction costs increase as the number of patrons rise,
hence the managers become more powerful.
3.  Managers’ power is inversely correlated to members’ participation in the cooperative
management. This relationship is due to the fact that members’ participation may
reduce managers’ power and because a strong manager may discourage members’
participation.
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Given these assumptions, an index of effective manager bargaining power was
developed, based on four indicators. Table 2 reports the definition of the indicators and
shows the absence of significant linear correlation with the equity/asset ratio. All data
refer to fiscal year 1995.
Table 2: Determining Factors for Manager Power








PPi percentage of revenues





rmi= price paid for members’
products
negative -0.1395




n i i i
revenues
app Dep NIAT å + + ,
NIAT= net income after taxes
dep = depreciation
app = year’s fund appropriations
positive 0.1197
LMi natural logarithm of the
number of members
ln(n. of members) positive 0.3629
PMi percentage of members
attending annual meeting
N/A negative -0.2531
                                                                                                                                                                    
4 The exclusion of  federations of cooperatives was due to the fact that in Italy federations are composed
exclusively by cooperatives represented either by their Board or by their managers. Then, the members-
managers relationship presented characteristics significantly different from the others cooperatives.8
The indicators were aggregated into a overall power index (PWi) calculated for
each cooperative according to the following function:
PWi= f(-PPi) + f(PCi) + f(LMi) + f(-PMi)
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Where j denotes value-added versus non value-added cooperatives;
xij is the value of any of the four indicators for the i
th cooperative;  j x  is the sample mean;
sj represents the sample standard deviation.
Each indicator captures a different aspect of manager’s power, and, when added together,
they give a general power score that can range from –4 to +4. A positive value for PWi
denotes effective bargaining power of managers (Powerful Manager Cooperatives or
PMC), while a negative PWi implies its absence (Non Powerful Manager Cooperatives or
NPMC). Given the theoretical framework, PMC were expected to pursue the
maximization of managers’ utility, while NPMC were assumed to pursue members’
utility maximization.
Table 4 compares and contrasts the identified PMCs with the NPMCs (all data refer to
fiscal year 1995). The table showed that, on average, PMCs were financially larger in
terms of revenues, equity and total assets.9
Table 3 : Descriptive Statistics for PMCs versus NPMCs (dollar values in millions)
PMC NPMC Average for
Total Sample
Number of Cooperatives 135 386 521
Average Revenues         $6.79          $3.90         $4.85
Average Net Income After Taxes $0.93 $0.37 $0.48
Average Equity $1.36 $0.46 $0.75
Average Total Assets         $6.59          $3.41         $4.46
Data source: Confcooperative





















































































































































Figure 1 describes the difference in the distribution of the equity/asset ratio. The graph
shows that the 69% of the NPMC have an equity/asset ratio lower than 0.1 vs. the 40% of
PMC. The average NPMC equity/asset ratio was 0.10 vs. 0.19 of PMCs.
5 A t-test under
the assumption of unequal variance comparing the equity/asset ratios showed that the two
sub-sample averages were significantly different (1% significance level). The test
provides first empirical evidence of the incidence of power distribution among groups on
the capital structure: on average PMCs are significantly less leveraged than NPMCs. The
empirical results support the theoretical framework and hypothesis.
The significant difference in leverage level implied different capitalization strategies. To
investigate these differences further, the determinants of cooperative capital structure
both for PMCs and NPMCs are analyzed in the following section using an econometric
model.
The Equity/Asset Regression Model.
In the previous section, an index for powerful manager cooperatives was specified and
calculated. In this section a regression model was used to determine the factors that
influence the equity/asset ratio for Italian agricultural cooperatives and to test differences
in PMCs’ capital structure.
The regression utilizes some of the explanatory variables proposed by Barton, Parcell and
Featherstone (1996) for the determination of the optimal cooperative capital structure.
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31.5% (livestock) to 70.7% (services). (USDA 1996)11
The dependent variable was the equity/asset ratio. Unlike the Barton, Parcell and
Featherstone model, the variance of the interest rate was not included in this analysis.
6 In
order to adapt the model to the Italian context, the fixed assets/total asset ratio and a
dummy variable identifying the value added cooperatives were added. Hence, the
investment structure and the activity of the cooperative become endogenous variables in
the model. Finally, a dummy variable identifying PMC was added, in order to test the
study hypothesis. The explanatory variables are described in table 4 and, unless specified,
all values refer to fiscal year 1995.
According to the standard  dummy-variable technique, all of the cross products of the
powerful manager dummy variable and the continuous variables were included in the
model. These variables were instrumental in capturing the influence of the presence of
powerful managers on each individual coefficient. Thus, the specific impact on each
factor was evaluated. The expected sign of these instrumental variables represents the
expected change in the coefficient of the relative continuous variable due to the presence
of powerful managers. Thus, a decrease in the profitability or in the interest rate was
expected to have less impact in PMCs because managers, concerned about risk, would
use their power to limit the use of debts. Conversely, an increase in the performance or
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s is the solvency ratio, r is the Pratt-Arrow decreasing relative risk aversion coefficient, s
2
A is the
variability of the return on assets, RA is the return on assets and K is the interest rate. Similar models were
developed by Collins (1985) for farmer leverage and Foster (1996) for Agribusiness firms. The formula
explains the expected signs of the coefficients of prof, int and vp9496 reported in table 6. The expected
sign for the asstr variable was stated by Titman and Wessel (1988).12
operational risk was expected to have a greater impact on PMCs, given the risk
minimizing preferences of the managers.
Table 4: Explanatory Variables of the GLS Model
Variable Description Definition Expected sign
profi A proxy for cooperative
profitability.
i
i n i i i i
revenues
app dep NIAT rm pr å + + + + ,
pri= patronage refunds paid to members
rmi= price paid for members’ products,
NIATi= net income after tax
depi = depreciation,
app = year’s fund appropriations
positive







intexi = interest expenses
TAi = total assets
positive





vp9496i A proxy for the variability of
cooperative profitability.
standard deviation(profi,t)
t = 1994, 1995, 1996
positive
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positive
Results.
The model was estimated using the GLS approach to correct for heteroskedasticity which
was indicated by the Breusch Pagan test (significant at 1% level). The results of the
equity/asset ratio regression model are shown in table 5.13
Table 5: Equity/Asset Ratio GLS Regression Results
Variable Coefficient t-Stat
 intecept -0.0251 0.7764
 prof 0.0925 *3.3134
 int 1.9108 *12.1836
 asst 0.3214 *6.8304
 vp9496 -0.1007 1.2789
 valadd -0.0575 *3.3121
 pm -0.0046 0.0927
 pm*prof 0.0580 1.0580
 pm*int -1.0148 *2.0719
 pm*asst 0.1517 **1.7469
 pm*vp9496 0.3928 *2.6641
GLS weighted regression R
2 0.5074
F-statistic *52.5393
F-stat. for test on joint significance
of all coefficient related to pm *7.9294
*  Significant at 1% level
**Significant at 10% level
The signs of the continuous variable coefficients coincided with the expectations outlined
in table 4. The only exception was vp9496, which was negative but not significant at 10%
level. Later in the paper, this result is explained when a comparison is made between
NPMCs and PMCs. The coefficient sign of dummy variable pmi presented a positive sign
which was contrary to the expectation. However, the associated t-statistic showed that the
coefficient was not significant at 10% level.
The equity/asset ratio was positively correlated with the cost of financing, fixed
asset/total asset ratio and cooperative profitability. These results are intuitive. An increase
in the interest rate makes equity sources more attractive, because it raises the cost of debt
financing; a correlation between fixed assets and equity is considered good management14
to reduce risk induced by operating leverage; and a high profitability may make members
more willing to invest in that cooperative.
The model supports the hypothesis of structural change: PMCs presented a significantly
different equity structure than NPMCs. The F-test on the joint significance of all the
parameters associated with the dummy variable (pmi) and its cross-products was
significant at the 1% level. The result provides statistical evidence of the influence of
manager power in the determination of the equity/asset ratio. The individual t-tests on the
variables confirmed that PMCs presented significant difference in all slope coefficients
except profitability, which means that these cooperatives reacted to changes in their
environment by adopting different capital structure strategies.  In particular, the results
stressed the differences in the reaction to a change in the cost of financing and profit
variability (both statistically significant at 1% level). The signs of instrumental variables’
coefficients are consistent with the expectations, except for the cross product between the
variables (pmi) and (profi) which is positive but not significant.
The estimation of the two separate regression equations provided more detailed insight
into the differences in the determinants of the capital structure between PMCs and
NPMCs:15
Powerful Manager Cooperatives (135 observations, R
2: 0.35, F-stat: 11.38):
(E/A)i= - 0.05 + 0.16 profi  + 0.90 intexi  + 0.30 vp9496i + 0.48assti – 0.04 valaddi
t-stat:    (0.43)    (2.65)*             (1.59)                (1.95)**                (5.33)*          (1.15)
Non Powerful Manager cooperatives (386 observations, R
2: 0.48, F-stat: 68.86):
(E/A)i= -0.01 + 0.09 profi  + 1.88 intexi - 0.11 vp9496i + 0.32 assti – 0.07 valaddi
t-stat:   (0.21)    (3.39)*             (12.82)*           (1.49)                    (7.40)*          (3.45)*
*   Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
Compared to powerful manager cooperatives, NPMCs’ had more significant coefficients
of profitability (prof), asset structure index (asst), and interest rate (intex). In addition, the
two types of cooperatives reacted differently to an increase in the variability of
profitability (vp9496): on average, PMCs were expected to increase equity, while
NPMCs reduced it. Both NPMC and PMC react to an increase in the asset structure ratio
by increasing equity, even if the latter showed a higher sensitivity. Changing the interest
rate (coeteris paribus) was expected to have a significant influence on the capital
structure of NPMC, however there was no definitive evidence of its influence on PMCs’
leverage (the coefficient has a p-value of 0.11). NPMCs’ sensitivity to cost of financing
may be explained by the members’ concern about the profit margin reduction due to
interest expenses. Instead, powerful managers, being more concerned about risk than
profitability, may be less willing to reduce equity even if the interest rate on debt
decreases. The difference in coefficient signs for profit variability can be explained by the
risk minimizing approach of powerful managers (that led to lower leverage) and by the
unwillingness of members to invest capital in a risky business.16
Conclusions.
Excessive leverage is one of the most important problems facing Italian agricultural
cooperatives as the international competition in the EU intensifies. The analysis showed
that there is a structural difference between powerful manager cooperatives and non-
powerful manager cooperatives. Powerful manager cooperatives: were less leveraged,
had more conservative financial strategy and focused on minimizing financial risk by
increasing their equity/asset ratio. The overall strategy of these cooperatives increased the
probability of long term competitiveness of the cooperative. The important byproduct
from powerful managers maximizing their objectives was that the higher equity/asset
ratio reduces the financial distress making more resources available for international
competitiveness.
The maximizing strategy of powerful managers, however, is a different strategy than the
members. The data and the analysis illustrate that the members prefer to provide
minimum capital to the cooperative. Thus, we have a dilemma where managers’ behavior
reduces the utility of the members but increases the total value and competitiveness of the
cooperative. Given the fact that 48% of Italian cooperatives have an equity/asset ratio less
than .1 and that cooperative equity/asset ratios are significantly lower than the investor
owned firms in Italy, the industry and the government needs to find tools to encourage
members to invest.17
The objective of future research should focus on ways to align the membership’s
objectives and the managers’ objectives to a value maximizing strategy. New generation
cooperatives and trust-based relationship are of particular interest. The members’
investment minimizing behavior must be understood so that the fundamental structure of
the cooperatives has an incentive for strong membership and good capital structure.
Improving the cooperative internal bargaining process among groups also needs to be
analyzed. Lastly, policies that positively reinforce the current investment-minimizing
behavior of members need to be addressed.18
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